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Summary 
After the General Court’s (GC) decision in case T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S 
and Lundbeck Ltd v Commission it seems the concept of potential competition 
in the context of so-called ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements, or reverse patent 
settlements, might have been altered; that the bar in order for an undertaking 
to qualify as a potential competitor might have been lowered. This thesis aims 
to examine whether this is true, and if so to what extent. Starting with an 
introduction to competition law and the concept of patent settlements, 
followed by a description of the specifics of Article 101 TFEU, and the 
relationship between competition law and intellectual property rights, this 
essay aims to provide enough knowledge that the reader will have no trouble 
following the analysis of the case and its potential implications.  
 
In 2010, the Commission launched formal proceedings against Lundbeck, a 
Danish pharmaceutical company, which in 2002 and 2003 had entered into 
agreements with four generic pharmaceutical undertakings concerning the 
anti-depressant citalopram. The four companies undertook to not enter the 
market with generic versions of citalopram for a certain period of time. In 
exchange, Lundbeck paid each sums which largely corresponded to the 
profits that the generic firms expected to make had they entered the market, 
or to the damages they would have obtained if they had been successful in 
litigation against Lundbeck. The agreements were all separately found, by the 
Commission and later also the GC, to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object 
as they restricted potential competition. At time the agreements were 
concluded Lundbeck’s original compound patents had expired, however they 
still held a number of process patents. Had any of the four generic 
undertakings chosen to enter the market they might have done so at risk of 
infringing one of Lundbeck’s patents. The Commission and the GC however 
still regarded the four companies to be potential competitors to Lundbeck, 
thus paying them to stay off the market was a restriction on competition. 
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Comparing the ruling in Lundbeck to previous case-law dealing with the 
concept of potential competition, and relying on comments and opinions by 
legal scholars and practitioners the analysis centres around whether the GC 
did right in defining potential competition as it did, and what the implications 
of the case might be in that regard. Many questions remain without answer in 
the GC’s judgement, hopefully clarification will be provided for when the 
European Court of Justice reviews the case, which is currently under appeal. 
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Preface 
Since starting my legal studies I have always known that I wanted to combine 
the Swedish law programme with courses which had a focus towards EU law. 
After my exchange semester at Maastricht Universiteit I had become even 
more sure of this, and had found my interest for EU competition law 
specifically. Finding a Master’s programme at my home university in Lund 
has offered me a chance to deepen my knowledge in both EU law in general, 
as well as in specifically EU competition law.  
 
My five years at Lund University have been a delight. Thank you all who 
have been a part, and a special thank you to my supervisor Justin Pierce for 
supporting me in the writing of this essay.  
 
Sofie Olovsson, Lund, 2017. 
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Abbreviations 
API Active pharmaceutical ingredient  
ECJ Court of Justice 
EU European Union 
GC General Court 
IPR Intellectual property rights 
NCA National competition authority 
SPC Supplementary protection certificate 
TEU Treaty of the European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the functioning of the European Union  
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1 Introduction to the Research 
This essay is focused around the concept of potential competition in reverse 
patent settlements under Article 101 TFEU. As the EU courts do not limit 
their investigations of what might amount to an infringement of Article 
101(1) to only involving actual, but also potential competition, the notion, 
and its scope, provides for an interesting topic to analyse.  
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
The overarching purpose of this essay is to review the concept of potential 
competition in the context of patent settlements containing reverse payments, 
so-called ‘pay-for-delay’ settlements or ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements.  The 
research keeps focus on when these agreements should be found to infringe 
EU competition law, more specifically Article 101(1) TFEU. It is fairly easy 
to see how paying a potential competitor to stay off the market in which you 
are active may very well distort competition, and in the end harm consumers 
which may have to pay more for a product than they would had there been 
more competition. However, what happens if an undertaking enters into a 
pay-for-delay agreement with another company which might not have been 
able to enter the market due to e.g. legal obstacles, even if the agreement had 
not been in place? Has the agreement then actually amounted to an 
infringement of potential competition, and thus EU competition law? 
 
With the recent Commission decision and General Court (GC) ruling in the 
Lundbeck-case1 these questions have been raised. In this essay I attempt to 
look into the concept of potential competition and how far the notion 
stretches, in order to provide an answer to the question: 
 
- Given the ruling in Lundbeck, has the scope for who can be regarded 
as a potential competitor in pay-for-delay agreements been extended?  
                                                
1 Commission Decision C (2013) 3803 final, Lundbeck; Case T-472/13 H Lundbeck A/S 
and Lundbeck Ltd v Commission.  
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1.2 Research Aims  
With a primary aim of answering the question posed above, this research 
centres around the Commission decision and GC ruling in the case of 
Lundbeck v Commission.2 My aim is essentially to investigate what changes 
the ruling may have brought about as regards potential competition in patent 
settlement cases, and what possible positive or negative outcomes these 
changes might have for EU competition law, if any at all. Further, the aim is 
to investigate whether the conclusions drawn by the Court and Commission 
in Lundbeck can be applied in a general sense to the concept of potential 
competition or if they are so specific that they might only be applicable in the 
specific circumstances of the pharmaceutical sector, or even in the specific 
case itself. My hope is that this essay will facilitate access to information on 
the topic for students, as well as others who are new to the notions described. 
1.3 Research Limitations and Delimitations 
The focus of this essay lies solely on the concept of potential competition in 
pay-for-delay agreements under EU law. No wider comparisons will be made, 
not with Member State legislation, the situation and legislation in the United 
States, nor with the concept of potential competition in relation to other types 
of agreements or situations.  
 
The concept will only be scrutinised under Article 101 TFEU, not under 
Article 102 as potential abuse of a dominant position. As regards Article 101, 
the main focus lies on the first paragraph as it is the one containing the 
prohibition. The possibility of being exempted under Article 101(3) is not 
elaborated on. As regards the restriction to competition law a pay-for-delay 
agreement might be regarded as, no deeper analysis is provided for on 
whether this should be deemed a restriction by object or effect. Concerning 
relevant case law and comments by legal scholars and practitioners a selection 
has been made, although my hope is I have chosen in a way which facilitates 
                                                
2 Case T-472/13. 
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the understanding of my thesis in an adequate way, and in a way which 
illuminates different aspects. 
 
All limitations to this essay have been made in order to focus on, and analyse 
deeply enough, where the bar is set for potential competition in pay-for-delay 
agreements since the delivery of the Lundbeck ruling. In order to do so, and 
due to lack of space certain very interesting aspects surrounding the topic of 
this essay have been excluded, even though these aspects might have provided 
me with more context and a deeper understanding.  
1.4 Selected Review of Literature  
There is no lacking of literature in the field of EU competition law, meaning 
rather than having trouble finding material the challenge was to select what 
to include and what not to. For the more introductory and descriptive parts of 
this essay the works of Whish and Bailey, and Faull and Nickpay, have 
provided great help, as they present information in a well-structured and 
neutral manner. It is also to the works of these authors I have turned when 
attempting to describe the relation between competition law and intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). The more analytical sections specifically regarding the 
Lundbeck case include comments and papers by Dunne, Friend, and the trio 
Boehme, Frank and Kerber, which all tackle reverse patent settlements and 
present different views on the matter. In selecting these authors my goal has 
been to provide the reader with an assortment of opinions which can, 
hopefully, lead to a greater and more nuanced understanding of the concept 
of potential competition in pay-for-delay settlements, and what implications 
the ruling in Lundbeck might have in this regard. 
1.5 Research Method and Materials  
The materials used in this research are the main available sources of EU law; 
primary EU legislation (mainly Article 101 TFEU and the Regulation on 
Technology Transfer Agreements3), relevant case-law from the courts of the 
                                                
3 Commission Regulation No 316/2014, OJ [2014] L 93/17. 
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EU, related Commission Decisions, as well as relevant Guidelines from the 
Commission. Academic works, such as books, papers and commentaries are 
included as well, and have been helpful in providing context and a wider 
understanding for the issues related to my research question.  
1.5.1 Legal Doctrinal Method 
The chosen method is the legal doctrinal method (or legal dogmatics). The 
method aims to form a base which provides for an understanding and 
explanation of the existing law, while also providing for a further discovery 
and evaluation of the law, often leading it to change.4 Legal dogmatics include 
the inquiry of the law as it is (de lege lata) , as well as the possibility to express 
an opinion of how the law should be (de lege ferenda).5 In attempting to 
answer the main research question, both aspects of the legal doctrinal method 
provide useful. Any piece of legislation cannot be properly evaluated if 
separated from the context surrounding it, and the concept of potential 
competition in reverse patent settlements thus cannot be properly assessed 
without the overarching context of EU competition law and its purpose and 
goals. 
1.6 Outline and Disposition 
This thesis leads with an introduction to EU competition law and the concept 
of patent settlements, followed by an introduction to Article 101 TFEU, and 
an overview of the relationship between competition law and intellectual 
property rights. The concept of potential competition is introduced, including 
relevant case law on the topic. Lastly the Commission decision and GC ruling 
in Lundbeck are presented, along with as well positive as critical comments 
by legal scholars and practitioners, before a final analysis is made with a focus 
on providing an answer to the research question.  
                                                
4 Stelmach, Jerzy & Brozek, Bartosz, Methods of legal reasoning, Dordrecth: Springer, 
2006, pp 17-19. 
5 Eng, Svein, Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of 
‘Descriptive Proposition’ and ‘Normative Proposition’ as Concepts of Degree, Ratio Juris 
Issue 3, 2000, pp 236-260. 
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2 Introduction to EU Competition 
Law 
The European Union (EU) is established by two Treaties: these are the Treaty 
of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).  Through these Treaties, the Member States entrust 
the EU with certain competences, in order for the Union’s objectives to be 
fulfilled.6 One of these objectives is the establishment of  an internal market, 
which shall work for a highly competitive social market economy.7 Protocol 
27 to the Treaties8, having the same force9,  states that the internal market as 
set out in Article 3 TEU includes a system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted. Hence, competition law is an important part of EU law, and a large 
portion of EU law is aimed at eliminating possible obstacles to free 
movement, and promoting competition within the Union.10  
 
The main EU competition rules, which the EU has an exclusive competence 
in establishing11, are contained in Articles 101-109 TFEU and the EU Merger 
Regulation12. The focus of the essay remains on Article 101 TFEU, which 
through its first paragraph prohibits agreements, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the 
restriction of competition, unless certain conditions set out in the third 
paragraph are met.  
 
The EU institution with the main responsibility as regards competition law is 
the European Commission (the Commission).13 The Commission carries out 
investigations, and is the body which will take action against infringements 
                                                
6 Article 5 TEU. 
7 Article 3(3) TEU. 
8 Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition. 
9 Article 51 TEU. 
10 Whish, Richard & Bailey, David, Competition Law (8th Edition), Oxford Competition 
Law [OCL], July 2015, p 52 f; Craig, Paul & de Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law: Texts, Cases, 
and Materials, (6th edition) Oxford University Press, 2015, pp 1001-1002.  
11 Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
12 Council Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 
[2004] L 24/1. 
13 Article 17(1) TEU. 
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of competition law through adopting decisions and imposing penalties on 
breaches. It is the Commission which adopts block exemption regulations, 
develops policy and legislative initiatives, and cooperates with National 
Competition Authorities (NCAs). 14 A party subject to a Commission decision 
can however submit an appeal against such a decision. In that case the GC 
will review the legality of the decision in accordance with the relevant 
provisions in TFEU.15 The GC can assess evidence, annul a contested 
decision and alter the amount of a fine.16 A decision from the GC can in turn 
be appealed to the Court of Justice (the ECJ), however only on points of law.17 
2.1 Introduction to Patent Settlements 
The Commission, having a leading role in EU competition policy, can also 
conduct so-called sectoral inquiries. During recent years the pharmaceutical 
sector has been given much attention.18 Especially reviewing settlements of 
patent disputes has been highly prioritised. Patent settlements are, as other 
settlement agreements, agreements which aim to settle a dispute between two 
parties, thus avoiding litigation in front of a court.19 Specific for patent 
settlements is that they will settle a patent dispute. The certain kind being 
relevant for this essay is pay-for-delay settlements, also called reverse patent 
settlements. These are agreements where the owner of an IPR (typically a 
patent) will transfer value, usually in the form of a monetary transfer, to 
another undertaking. In exchange the latter offers a commitment to delay 
entry into, or not enter, the market with a generic product at a lower price.20 
The value transfer being the ‘pay’ for the commitment to ‘delay’ entry 
explains the name.  
                                                
14 On the powers of the Commission, see Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation 
of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.  
15 Article 261 (penalties); Article 263 (actions for annulment); Article 265 (failures to act). 
16 C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission, para 67. 
17 Whish & Bailey, p 58. 
18 See the Commission’s Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report of 8 July 2009. 
19 Whish & Bailey, p 838. 
20 Faull, Jonathan & Nikpay, Ali, The EU Law of Competition (3rd Edition), Oxford 
Competition Law [OCL], March 2014, pp 1888 -1889; Guidelines on the application of 
Article 101 to technology transfer agreements, para 238. 
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3 Article 101 TFEU  
In order to understand why pay-for-delay settlements can harm competition, 
one must study the rule which they are in danger of breaching. As stated this 
essay focuses only on the probability of breaching Article 101 TFEU, therefor 
this is the rule which needs to be considered. Breaking down the article the 
first paragraph states the prohibition, paragraph two declares all actions in 
breach of paragraph one to be automatically void, and the third paragraph 
offers a possibility to be exempted from paragraph one if certain criteria are 
fulfilled. This essay, and particularly this chapter, focuses only on the first 
paragraph. 
 
3.1 What does Article 101 prohibit? 
Article 101 (1) TFEU states: 
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market… 
 
By looking at the wording it can be noted that there are quite a few criteria to 
be met in order for the article to be applicable. Firstly, the parties to the 
agreement must be undertakings. The Court of Justice has defined an 
undertaking as ‘every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of 
the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed’21. The 
offering of goods or services on a given market constitutes an economic 
activity,22 leading a pharmaceutical company to fulfil the first criteria in 
Article 101(1) TFEU. 
 
                                                
21 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH, para 21. 
22 Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds 
Medische Specialisten, para 75. 
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Secondly, the actions of the undertakings concerned must amount to an 
agreement, decision or concerted practice. Article 101(1) covers agreements23 
both on a horizontal and vertical level, meaning both agreements between 
competitors as well as between non-competitors; actors on different levels of 
the market, for example a supplier and a distributor, are included under the 
article.24  
 
What does then constitute an agreement which is at risk of being caught by 
Article 101(1)? The ECJ has stated that the important factor is ‘the existence 
of a concurrence of wills’25, however how this is manifested or formulated is 
not what is of importance. Consequently an agreement may take a variety of 
shapes and forms; an oral agreement26, the exchange of correspondence27, or 
a so called gentlemen’s agreement28 have all been deemed by the GC or the 
ECJ to constitute an agreement within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
As regards judicial settlements; agreements between undertakings to settle 
litigation, e.g. on matters of intellectual property as is the case with pay-for-
delay agreements, these may very well fall under Article 101(1).29 
 
Concerted practices entail conduct which does not stem from an agreement 
or decisions but which can nevertheless come to be caught by Article 101(1). 
In a leading case on the matter, commonly referred to as the Dyestuffs case30, 
the ECJ upheld a Commission decision where the Commission found an 
infringement of Article 101(1) through looking at things such as  informal 
contact, timing of price increases and instructions going out from parent to 
subsidiary. The Court stated in its ruling that concerted practices falling with 
the scope of Article 101(1) aim to prohibit ‘a form of coordination between 
undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement 
                                                
23 I will use the term agreement short for agreements, decisions and concerted practices. 
24 Joined Cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v Commission; Whish & Bailey, p 103. 
25 Case T-41/96, Bayer v Commission. 
26 Case 28/77 Tepea v Commission; Cases T-25/95 etc Cimenteries CBR SA v Commission. 
27 Case C-260/09 P Activision Blizzard Germany GmbH v Commission. 
28 Case 41/ 69 ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission; Case T-53/03 BPB plc v Commission. 
29 Faull & Nikpay, p 217; Commission Decision C (2013) 3803 final, Lundbeck; 
Commission Decision OJ 1982 L379/19, Toltecs-Dorcet. 
30 Case 48/69, ICI v Commission. 
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properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical 
cooperation between them for the risks of competition.’31 In a situation where 
all incriminating evidence may have been destroyed by the parties it is 
important that the Commission be able to rely on even a thing such as parallel 
behaviour on the market in order to capture illegal conduct.32 However, as 
patent settlement agreements, such as pay for delay agreements, are formal, 
written agreements it is not necessary for the sake of this essay to further 
examine the notion of concerted practices.  
 
As the concept of decisions between associations of undertakings is relevant 
mainly when dealing with trade associations this will not be examined here.  
 
3.2 Restriction by Object or Effect 
A third criteria is that the agreement at issue must have as an object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. The two conditions 
are alternative, meaning only when it is not clear that an agreement has as its 
object to restrict competition is it necessary to consider if it might have such 
an effect.33  
 
As regards restrictions by object this means such restrictions which ‘by their 
very nature have the potential to restrict competition within the meaning of 
Article 101(1)’.34 From the wording in the article it can be gathered that if an 
anti-competitive object is found there is no need for an actual anti-competitive 
effect. This has been repeatedly stated by the ECJ in a number of cases.35 
However in order to determine this every agreement must be looked at in the 
                                                
31 Case 48/69 ICI v Commission, para 64. 
32 Whish & Bailey, p 117. 
33 Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, p 249. 
34 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, para 29; Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements 
(Guidelines on Cooperation Agreements), OJ [2011] C11/1, para 24; Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C101/97, para 21. 
35 Such as Joined Cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-
Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission, Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission and Case C-8/08 T-Mobile. 
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light of its objectives, context – legal as well as economic, the intent of the 
parties , as well as the agreement’s content and way of implementation.36 
 
For some time it seemed the test for what amounted to a restriction by object 
was expanding to be wider and wider; for example in T-Mobile37 the ECJ 
stated that it is sufficient that a concerted practice, as the case was dealing 
with, has the potential to have a negative impact on competition in order to 
be ascribed an anti-competitive object.38 However, in Groupement des Cartes 
Bancaires39 the ECJ made an important clarification, saying that the GC had 
been erring in law when concluding that restriction by object was not a 
concept which needed to be interpreted restrictively. Rather ‘the concept of 
restriction of competition ‘by object’ can be applied only to certain types of 
coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm 
to competition that it may be found that there is no need to examine their 
effects’.40  
 
If there is no restriction to competition by object ‘the consequences of the 
agreement should then be considered and for it to be caught by the prohibition 
it is then necessary to find that those factors are present which show that 
competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an 
appreciable extent. The competition in question must be understood within 
the actual context in which it would occur in the absence of the agreement in 
dispute’.41 This means that the Commission at first hand, and in later instances 
the European courts, must assess whether there has been an infringement to 
competition law by the effects of an agreement, decision or concerted 
practice. In making this assessment one must look at the market as it behaves 
and contrast this with what could have been the situation had the agreement 
under scrutiny not been in effect. If the conclusion is that there would have 
                                                
36 Faull & Nikpay, p 235. 
37 Case C-67/13 P. 
38 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, para 31. 
39 Case C-67/13 P. 
40 Case C-67/13 P, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v European Commission, para 
58. 
41 Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH pp 249-250. 
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been appreciably more competition in the absence of the agreement, the 
agreement is having an anti-competitive effect and therefor is in breach of 
Article 101(1) TFEU.42 The question of when this is the case, and how this is 
to be measured generally centres around two things. The first is the impact of 
the agreement on the internal market, and the second is the impact of the 
agreement on the process of rivalry, both between the parties to the agreement 
and/or from third parties.43  
 
How the agreements in Lundbeck specifically were assessed relating to 
infringement by object or effect is discussed further down, and the 
information provided for in this chapter will hopefully serve as a good base 
for the discussion to follow.  
3.3 An Effect on Competition 
As stated above Article 101(1) prohibits agreements which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. In 
order to know when something distorts competition one must first know what 
is meant by competition in this case. As regards Article 101(1) the notion 
covers not only restrictions of actual but also of potential competition.44 This 
means that in terms of competitors it does not suffice to look at those already 
active on the relevant market. One must also factor in what effects the 
agreement at hand has on new potential actors on the market – is it creating 
barriers to entry or aggravating market circumstances in any other way? It is 
however important to note that in making this assessment, the view on what 
qualifies as potential competition is to be realistic; neither too speculative nor 
too theoretical.45  
 
According to the Commission’s Guidelines on cooperation agreements, a 
company is to be treated as a potential competitor of another company if, in 
absence of the agreement, it would be likely that in the case of a small but 
                                                
42 Faull & Nikpay, p 237. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Case T-504/93 Tiércé-Ladbroke v Commission, paras 158-159; Case T-461/07 Visa 
Europe Limited and Visa International Service v Commission, paras 127, 131, and 146. 
45 Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, para 10. 
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permanent increase in relative prices the former company would undertake 
the necessary additional investments or other necessary switching costs to 
enter the relevant market on which the latter is active, within a short period 
of time.46 The concept of potential competition specifically in pay-for-delay 
situations will be examined in Chapters 4 through 6. 
3.4 De Minimis & Effect on Trade between 
Member States 
In addition, for Article 101(1) to be applicable, there is a rule of double 
appreciability which needs to be satisfied. The effects of an agreement must 
have an appreciable effect on competition as well as on trade between 
Member States. Agreements which effect competition and would normally be 
caught by Article 101(1) will nevertheless not be caught if they lack having 
an appreciable impact either on competition or on inter-state trade.47 This 
doctrine, called the de minimis doctrine, was formulated in Völk v Vervaecke48 
and has since then been repeated a number of times. The recent ruling in 
Expedia Inc v Autorité de la Concurrence49 has however provided for a 
significant clarification. As restrictions by object are ‘by their very 
nature…injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition’50, an 
agreement restricting competition by object is automatically in violation of 
Article 101(1) TFEU, as long as it may effect trade between Member States.51 
This clarification eliminates the burden on the Commission of proving double 
appreciability when dealing with object restrictions.  
 
The criteria of affecting trade between Member States has historically been 
interpreted widely, thus giving Article 101(1) a large scope.52 Today, when 
all Member States have effective competition rules of their own, abusive 
behaviour can be caught without the help of EU competition law. However, 
                                                
46 Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, para 10. 
47 Case 5/69, Völk v Vervaecke p 295. 
48 Case 5/69. 
49 Case C-226/11. 
50 Ibid, para 36. 
51 Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc v Autorité de la Concurrence, para 37. 
52 Whish & Bailey, p 154. 
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determining whether an agreement or practice has an effect on trade between 
Member States is still of importance, because this is turn impacts how 
national law and EU competition law should work together; e.g. when a NCA 
is obliged to apply Article 101 and 10253, how communication between NCAs 
and the Commission should work54, and when stricter national rules are 
allowed55.  
 
The effect on trade criterion is fulfilled when an agreement may affect trade 
between Member States, and the effects are appreciable.56 Trade between 
Member States is a wide concept and covers all cross-border activity as well 
as activities which affect the competitive structure of the market, meaning a 
situation where only parts of states are affected is enough.57 The notion ‘may 
affect’ means that, on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact, it 
must be possible to foresee that the agreement or practice may have an 
influence on the pattern on trade between Member states. This influence may 
be direct or indirect, actual or potential.58 As regards appreciability a 
presumption can be made that the stronger a position on the market the 
undertakings concerned hold, the more likely it is that their actions will have 
an appreciable effect on trade between Member States.59 The Commission’s 
Guidelines on inter-state trade60 provide two rebuttable presumptions, based 
on market shares and annual turnover, as guidance for when an agreement or 
practice is likely to have or not have an appreciable effect on trade between 
Member States.61 Examining these further, however, is not within the scope 
of this research. 
 
As a final comment for this chapter, important to note is that Article 101 
TFEU does not cover unilateral conduct. As you cannot enter into an 
                                                
53 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Article 3(1). 
54 Ibid, Article 11. 
55 Ibid, Article 3(2). 
56 Article 101(1) TFEU; Whish & Bailey, pp 154-155. 
57 Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 
OJ [2004] C 101/81 (Guidelines on inter-state trade), paras 19- 20, 30. 
58 Ibid, para 23. 
59 Ibid, para 45. 
60 OJ [2004] C 101/81. 
61 Ibid, paras 52-53. 
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agreement with yourself, two or more parties are required for Article 101 to 
be applicable. Unilateral conduct can still be caught by EU competition rules, 
however that is not something this essay has room to elaborate on. 
 
Having examined Article 101, with a focus on paragraph 1, the following 
chapter studies the relationship between competition law and intellectual 
property law. 
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4 Competition Law and Intellectual 
Property Rights 
In order to understand why and how pay-for-delay settlements can infringe 
competition law, and more specifically Article 101(1) TFEU, it is necessary 
to have some insight into the relationship between competition law and 
intellectual property rights.  At first glance, it might seem that these two 
branches of law will inevitably conflict with one another. IPRs grant their 
owners exclusive rights, legal monopolies, e.g. through patents, copyrights 
and trademarks, whereas competition law has an open market as its goal. 
However, as has been explicitly stated – presuming such a conflict proves a 
lacking in nuance, and would be incorrect.62 Rather the two legal areas can 
support one another, and share the common goal of protecting consumer 
welfare. The Guidelines on the application of Article 101 to technology 
transfer agreements63, which are examined in the following section, state the 
following: ‘Indeed, both bodies of law share the same basic objective of 
promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources. 
Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic component of an open and 
competitive market economy’.64  
 
Still, there are ways in which the usage of IPRs may harm competition. As 
this essay focuses on Article 101(1) TFEU this article is the only piece of 
legislation examined in this context. The main way in which Article 101(1) 
can come into play when dealing with intellectual property is through 
different types of licencing agreements, they can be patent licences granting 
a territorial exclusivity, licences granting design rights, or software licences, 
to mention a few.65 The Commission has adopted a Regulation66 exempting 
                                                
62 Whish & Bailey, p 812; Jacob, Robin Competition Authorities Support Grasshoppers: 
Competition Law as a Threat to Innovation, Competition Policy International, vol 9 nr 2 
2013, pp 15-29. 
63 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer 
agreements OJ [2004] C101/2 (Technology Transfer Guidelines). 
64 Ibid, rec 7. 
65 Whish & Bailey, pp 819-821. 
66 Regulation 316/2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements 
(Regulation on Technology Transfer Agreements). 
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many of these so-called ‘technology transfer agreements’ from Article 101(1) 
in the same way as Article 101(3) can do. Many of such agreements will 
however not infringe Article 101(1) at all and do not need this block 
exemption, but are regarded as pro-competitive and believed to have the 
effect of improving economic efficiency.67  
 
However, in a pay-for-delay settlement there is no intent or will to licence, 
the agreement instead serves to settle a dispute between two parties. Can such 
an agreement benefit from the Block Exemption Regulation or will it 
inevitably be caught by Article 101(1) TFEU? 
 
4.1 Patent Settlements & the Technology 
Transfer Guidelines 
The Commission has along with the Regulation on Technology Transfer 
Agreements also developed Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 
TFEU to Technology Transfer Agreements.68 Whilst there is no mention in 
the Regulation of settlement agreements the Guidelines provide some 
assistance on how these are to be viewed as regards the relationship between 
intellectual property rights and competition law.  
 
In principle, a settlement agreement is a legitimate way of finding a mutually 
acceptable compromise to a legal dispute.69 This goes for disputes regarding 
technology as well as for disagreements in several other commercial areas. It 
can save time and money for the disputing parties, at the same time as saving 
a court or competent administrative body the effort in deciding on the 
matter.70 However, there is a difference to be made between settlement 
agreements which do in fact contain a licensing agreement, and pay-for-delay 
agreements which commonly do not involve any transfer of technology 
rights. Settlement agreements of the pay-for-delay type are based on a value 
                                                
67 Regulation on Technology Transfer Agreements, rec 4. 
68 OJ [2004] C101/2. 
69 Technology Transfer Guidelines, para 235. 
70 Ibid. 
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transfer from one party to the another, in return for a limitation on the entry 
and/or expansion on the market of the latter. The Guidelines state that these 
type agreements may very well be caught by Article 101(1).71   
 
If such an agreement does include a licensing of the technology rights 
concerned by the underlying dispute, the agreement can still be caught under 
Article 101(1) after being assessed in the light of the hard-core restrictions 
provided for in Article 4 of the Regulation on Technology Transfer 
Agreements, if it leads to a delayed or otherwise limited ability for the 
licensee to launch the product on any concerned market.72  
 
Having established that pay-for-delay agreements may very well come to be 
caught by Article 101(1) TFEU, the following chapter focuses on one criteria 
laid down in that same article in particular – namely the distortion of 
competition, more specifically the notion of potential competition. What does 
the concept entail, and how far does it stretch?  
                                                
71 Technology Transfer Guidelines, para 238. 
72 Ibid, para 239. 
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5 Potential Competition 
5.1 Who can be a potential competitor? 
As described in chapter 2 the Commission and the EU Courts will take into 
account the possibility that an agreement will affect not only existing, but also 
potential, competition when deciding whether Article 101(1) TFEU has been 
infringed.  
 
It is well established that potential competition is one of the relevant 
parameters to include when making an assessment under Article 101(1). In 
analysing the conditions of competition within which an agreement is to be 
implemented, the GC has stated that the examination is to be ‘based not only 
on existing competition between undertakings already present on the relevant 
market but also on potential competition, in order to ascertain whether, in the 
light of the structure of the market and the economic and legal context within 
which it functions, there are ‘real concrete possibilities’ for the undertakings 
concerned to compete among themselves or for a new competitor to enter the 
relevant market and compete with established undertakings’.73  In order to 
demonstrate that an undertaking has such ‘real concrete possibilities’ to enter 
the relevant market there is a need for support in form of factual evidence or 
an analysis of the structures of said market.74 Consequently, an undertaking 
can only be regarded as a potential competitor if its entry into a market is an 
economically viable strategy.75 Important to bear in mind is that in assessing 
whether or not an undertaking can be regarded as a potential competitor is 
that it is never the intention of a potential competitor which is determinative. 
Whether an undertaking wishes to enter the market or not is irrelevant. The 
key criterion is simply whether there is a de facto ability for an undertaking 
to enter the relevant market.76 This means that the mere existence of an 
                                                
73 Case T-374/94 European Night Services v Commission, para 137 
74 Case T-360/09, E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON v Commission, para 86. 
75 Ibid; Case T-461/07, Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission, paras 
166-167. 
76 Case T-360/09, E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON v Commission, para 86; Case T-461/07, Visa 
Europe and Visa International Service v Commission paras 168-169. 
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undertaking currently outside a given market may give rise to competitive 
pressure on the undertakings currently operating in that market.77 This 
competitive pressure is linked to the probability that such a new competitor 
will enter the market in the case that it becomes more attractive for it to do 
so.78 
Should one as an active participant on the relevant market however be obliged 
to take into account a potential competitor if, say, that potential competitor 
has been in a position of having ‘real concrete possibilities’ to enter for 
several years and still not entered? Would this not have a negative impact on 
competition at large? The Commission Guidelines on cooperation agreements 
at Paragraph 10 state, as mentioned above, that ‘a company is treated as a 
potential competitor of another company if… it is likely that the former, 
within a short period of time, would undertake the necessary additional 
investments or other necessary switching costs to enter the relevant market’ 
(emphasis added). What qualifies as a ‘short period of time’ has been 
discussed by both the Commission in its Guidelines, more specifically in the 
footnotes, as well as by the GC in e.g. case Visa.79  
In Visa reference is made to the previous version of the Guidelines on 
cooperation agreements80, which stated that a likely market entry had to 
happen sufficiently fast that the threat of a potential entry would be a 
constraint on the behaviour of the undertakings active on the market. This 
would normally mean a period of maximum one year, though longer time 
periods could be taken into account in individual cases.81 The GC did 
however come to find the period of one year as being merely illustrative.82 
The Guidelines have since been revised and in the present time a period of 
not more than three years is considered a ‘short period of time’. Still, it is 
important to bear in mind that this does not mean that a potential competitor 
must enter the market within three years of having the ability to do so. All it 
                                                
77 Case T-461/07, Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission, para 169. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Case T-461/07, Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission. 
80 OJ 2001/C 3/02. 
81 Ibid, footnote no 9. 
82 Case T-461/07, Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission para 189. 
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means is that if in the absence of the possibly anti-competitive agreement, in 
case of a small but permanent increase in relative prices, it is likely that an 
undertaking would enter the relevant market within a ‘short period of time’, 
then it should be regarded as a potential competitor.  
Having looked into the qualifications of potential competition the following 
section presents some important case law revolving around the concept. 
5.2 Pre-Lundbeck Case Law 
5.2.1 European Night Services and others v 
Commission  
European Night Services Ltd (‘ENS’) was a joint venture set up by four 
railways companies, which intended to operate night passenger services 
through the Channel Tunnel in conjunction with its parent companies. 
Following notification of the agreement, the Commission concluded that the 
so-called ENS agreements had the potential of restricting actual or potential 
competition between the parent companies, between the parent companies 
and ENS, as well as vis-a-vis third parties.83  
 
The GC however rejected this conclusion. The Commission’s finding was 
merely a hypothesis ‘unsupported by any evidence or any analysis of the 
structures of the relevant market from which it might be concluded that it 
represented a real, concrete possibility‘84 The Commission had failed to make 
a correct and adequate assessment of the economic and legal context in which 
the ENS agreements were concluded85. It therefore did not demonstrate the 
existence of restrictions of potential competition within the meaning of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. 
 
                                                
83 Case T-374/94 European Night Services v Commission, para 135.  
84 Ibid, para 142. 
85 Ibid, para 144. 
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5.2.3 Visa Europe Ltd v Commission 
In Visa Europe Ltd v Commission86 Morgan Stanley, a financial institution, 
was denied Visa International membership in the ‘European Union’ region, 
on the ground that Morgan Stanley then owned the Discover Card network, 
considered to be a competitor of the Visa network. The refusal lasted from 
2000 until 2006, when Morgan Stanley was granted membership and 
withdrew its complaint to the Commission. The Commission however 
decided to nonetheless fine Visa International and Visa Europe.87  
 
According to the Commission, the result of the refusal was the prevention of 
a new potential competitor entering a market in which there was scope for 
further competition, despite it being marked by a high degree of 
concentration.88 The refusal to admit Morgan Stanley had not only prevented 
it from providing services for the acceptance of Visa cards, but also excluded 
it from transactions effected using MasterCard cards. Since merchants prefer 
to conclude a single contract covering all their transactions, they want to enter 
into contracts for acceptance of Visa and MasterCard with one and the same 
acquirer. Being refused Visa International membership thus put Morgan 
Stanley at a disadvantage also in the market for transactions effected using 
MasterCard.89   
 
As regards the assessment whether Morgan Stanley qualified as a potential 
competitor the GC stated that an undertaking’s intention to enter a market 
may be relevant to consider, however this is not the essential factor. The 
essential factor is instead the actual ability of an undertaking to enter that 
market.90 Entry into the market must be an economically viable strategy.91 In 
the case at hand Morgan Stanley’s entry into the market was not merely a 
theoretical hypothesis, rather it was a plausible assumption that the 
                                                
86 Case T-461/07. 
87 Commission Decision C (2007) 4471 final, Morgan Stanley. 
88 Ibid, para 22. 
89 Ibid, para 23. 
90 Ibid, para 168. 
91 Ibid, para 167. 
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undertaking would enter. This meant the Commission had done rightly when 
describing Morgan Stanley as a potential competitor.92 
5.2.4 E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON v Commission & 
GDF Suez SA v Commission  
In Joined Cases E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON AG and GDF Suez SA v 
Commission93 the Commission had fined the two energy companies E.ON  
and GDF Suez (GDF) for infringing EU competition law, due to a market-
sharing agreement regarding the French and German markets for natural 
gas.94 When the two companies in 1975 decided to together build a pipeline 
importing Russian gas to Germany and France the two also decided to divide 
the market amongst themselves and agreed not to sell gas conveyed by that 
gas pipeline on each other’s national markets.95 
 
In France GDF had a legal monopoly on importation and supply of gas, until 
2000, meaning that up until then the conduct as issue could not have restricted 
competition. Thus the infringement on the French market began in August 
2000, at the time when competitors could have started supplying customers 
in France. In Germany however there was no monopoly in place, meaning the 
infringement began in 1980 when the pipelines became operational.96  In 2004 
the companies had confirmed that they had since long regarded the anti-
competitive provisions of their agreement as ‘null and void’.97 Yet the 
Commission concluded that the agreement had, in fact, produced effects until 
at least the end of September 2005.98 The companies both brought actions 
against the decision. 
 
The GC mainly confirmed the Commission decision, however noting an error 
in the assessment of potential competition. Even though there was no 
                                                
92 Case T-461/07 Visa Europe Ltd v Commission, paras 186-187. 
93 Joined Cases T-360/09 and T-370/09. 
94 Commission Decision C (2009) 5355 final, E.ON/GDF. 
95 Joined Cases T-360/09 E.ON Ruhrgas and E.ON AG and T-370/09 GDF Suez SA v 
Commission, paras 21-23. 
96 Ibid, para 38. 
97 Ibid, para 25. 
98 Ibid, para 40. 
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monopoly on the German market, there were other agreements in place, 
covered by an exemption until 24 April 1998, which had the effect of 
establishing de facto a system of areas of exclusive supply.99 This meant, that 
up until the date when these agreements seized to be exempt there were de 
facto territorial monopolies covering the German gas market.100 These 
agreements were likely to have as a result an absence of competition, both 
actual and potential, on the relevant market.101 The Commission did not 
manage to show that, up until 24 April 1998, there would have been ‘real 
concrete possibilities’ for GDF to enter the German gas market, had the 
agreement at issue not applied.102 Consequently, the Commission failed to 
establish the existence of potential competition between the companies on the 
German market for gas between 1 January 1980 and 24 April 1998, which 
could have been adversely affected by the agreement between them. 
5.2.5 Summary  
To summarise some of the leading case law pre-Lundbeck the GC has been 
consistent in demanding that the Commission show that, had the agreement 
at issued not applied, there would have been ‘real concrete possibilities’ for 
an undertaking to enter the relevant market, and compete with established 
undertakings. Such a demonstration must be supported by evidence or an 
analysis of the structures of the relevant market, and not be based on a mere 
hypothesis. Accordingly, it is not the will or intention to enter a market which 
is essential for deciding who is a potential competitor or not – it is the ability 
to enter. Having established this the following chapter presents the Lundbeck 
case, with a focus on the view of the Commission and the GC on the concept 
of potential competition. 
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101 Ibid, para 103. 
102 Ibid, para 104.  
 28 
6 H. Lundbeck A/S and  Lundbeck 
Ltd v European Commission 
6.1 Facts and Circumstances 
In 2002 and 2003, the Danish pharmaceutical company Lundbeck entered 
into agreements with four separate generic pharmaceutical companies 
concerning the anti-depressant citalopram, a product responsible for 85% of 
Lundbeck’s turnover103. The product came both in the form of an active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (API) and in the form of a medicinal product. 
When the agreements were concluded Lundbeck's compound patents and data 
protection as well as the two original production process patents had expired. 
They did however still own a number of other process patents, including 
patents protecting the crystallisation process method (‘crystallisation 
patents’), with one granted in the United Kingdom 30 January 2002104, and 
one granted by the EPO on 22 September 2002.105 These process patents 
granted Lundbeck exclusive rights on certain new ways of producing the 
product.106 Yet, in principle, any undertaking using either the original 
production processes or a production process not covered by the still valid 
process patents could freely enter the EEA market with generic citalopram, 
provided they met the applicable regulatory requirements.107 
 
Since Lundbeck had not managed to introduce citalopram onto the larger 
European market until till middle of the 1990’s, but had patented the 
compound as early as 1976, the time available to commercially exploit the 
product was not very long.108 The possibility of competitors entering their 
generic products into the European market, which was considered possible as 
                                                
103 Commission Decision C (2013) 3803 final, Lundbeck, rec 623. 
104 Ibid, rec 275. 
105 Ibid, rec 342. 
106 Ibid, rec 3. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid, rec 123. 
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of year 2000109, embodied the greatest threat to Lundbeck, given the 
company's strong dependence on sales of citalopram.110  
 
At the time of the conclusion of the agreements, there was at least the potential 
of a patent dispute between each of the generic undertakings concerned and 
Lundbeck regarding the generic companies’ intentions to sell citalopram in a 
specific area111, mainly the UK market112. The companies with which the 
agreements were entered into had already begun the process of entering the 
market for generic citalopram, one had even succeeded.113 Instead of trying 
to enforcing its process patents before national courts Lundbeck entered into 
patent settlement agreements with each of the generic undertakings.114 The 
agreements each involved a transfer value from Lundbeck, to a value of 
around EUR 66.8 million in total115 in return for the generic undertaking’s 
promise not to sell generic citalopram in a certain geographical area for the 
duration of the agreement. This prevented the generic companies from 
marketing generic citalopram, regardless of whether such a product would 
have been produced in a way which infringed Lundbeck's process patents or 
not.116 However, none of the agreements actually resolved a patent dispute; 
they merely postponed generic entry for a certain period of time.117 
6.2 The Commission Decision 
The agreements were brought to the Commission’s attention by the Danish 
Competition Authority in 2003, after which the Commission began its 
investigation. In January 2008, the Commission decided to launch a broad 
inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector118, and once the final report119 of the 
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112 Ibid, rec 195. 
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sector inquiry had come out in 2009 formal proceedings against Lundbeck 
were launched in 2010. 
 
As regards potential competition and whether or not the generic companies 
could be regarded as potential competitors the Commission stated in its 
decision that ‘the agreements in the case at hand were agreements between 
undertakings that were at the time of events at least potential competitors’.120  
 
The Commission took into account the specific characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical sector in doing its assessment, and found that the sector is 
characterized by a highly dynamic competitive process due to the holding and 
expiry of patents.121 Generic undertakings will make hard efforts to be the 
first to compete with a generic version of an originator medicine,122 and the 
process to do so may start well in advance of the actual patent expiry. The 
company which manages to be first may profit from high profit margins until 
competition is intensified through the entry of more generic competitors, 
when prices will tend to drop.123 Because of this generic suppliers may be 
willing to make substantial investments as well as undertake certain risks, 
including that of infringing valid process patents that an originator 
undertaking might hold or might be applying for, in order to be the first to 
enter the market with a generic product.124 Through time the market will 
saturate and prices usually drop significantly compared to what the originator 
undertaking could charge, a process which can take up to five years according 
to the Commission’s assessment.125  
 
In the view of the Commission a generic undertaking has the potential of 
becoming a competitive threat to an originator undertaking even years before 
a compound patent expires. The Commission in its decision recited the ECJ 
in AstraZeneca126 where it stated that supplementary protection certificates 
                                                
120 Commission Decision C (2013) 3803 final, Lundbeck, rec 610. 
121 Ibid, rec 615. 
122 Ibid, rec 69. 
123 Ibid, rec 615. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid, rec 124, 615.  
126 Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca v Commission. 
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(SPCs), which extend with a maximum of five years the patent protection of 
medicinal products that are protected by a basic patent in the territory of a 
Member State, and are subject to a marketing authorisation before being 
placed on the market, are liable, though adversely affecting potential 
competition, to alter the structure of the market even before the expiry of the 
basic patents.127 According to the Commission this meant that the ECJ 
considers, in the pharmaceutical sector, that potential competition is likely to 
exist well before a basic patent expires, even when process patents are still in 
force.128 
 
When the agreements between Lundbeck and the generic companies were 
concluded in 2002 and 2003 Lundbeck's basic patent on the citalopram 
compound had lapsed in most of the EEA area.129 This meant that at that time, 
given that regulatory requirements as to quality, safety and efficacy were met, 
the market was open for generic citalopram medicine.130 Hence, in the view 
of the Commission, generic undertakings with a market plan to sell citalopram 
that had a realistic prospect of obtaining supplies of generic citalopram and 
receiving marketing authorisation all in the near future, were potential 
competitors both to each other and Lundbeck.131 According to evidence found 
by the Commission, Lundbeck had foreseen such competition from generic 
companies already in 1998. In November that year Lundbeck wrote: ‘Generic 
competition is foreseen on markets where the product patent has expired or 
where generic suppliers may invent a new manufacturing process.’132  
 
However, it was Lundbeck’s opinion that companies which could compete on 
the market with products whose manufacturing was infringing Lundbeck’s 
process patents could not be regarded as potential competitors, and held that 
this was the case at hand.133 Hence, Lundbeck had a right to exclude these 
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companies from the market.134 The Commission did not accept this view. The 
Commission did agree that it is true that ‘When granted by a public authority, 
an intellectual property right is normally assumed to be valid and an 
undertaking's ownership of that right is assumed to be lawful. The mere 
possession by an undertaking of an exclusive right normally results in keeping 
competitors away, since public regulations require them to respect that 
exclusive right.’135 However, it is not until a patent infringement has been 
proven, the generic undertaking has been injuncted by a court not to sell their 
product, and no possibilities of legal challenge remain, that a generic 
undertaking will seize to be regarded as a potential competitor of the 
originator undertaking.136 
 
Launching a product at risk of facing litigation from Lundbeck for patent 
infringement hence constituted, according to the Commission, a ‘real 
concrete possibility’ to enter the market.137 As patent litigation is very 
common in the pharmaceutical sector138, the Commission stated that patent 
challenges, which were present in the case139, are in fact also an expression 
of potential competition. They are an essential part of the competitive process 
between generic undertakings looking to enter the market for compounds that 
are no longer patent-protected and originator undertakings that invoke e.g. 
process patents against such market entry.140  
 
Lundbeck was not, in the Commission’s view, holding any right connected to 
its process patents to exclude the four generic competitors from the market 
though paying them as much as or more than they could possibly earn in profit 
from a market entry thus removing any incentive to compete with 
Lundbeck.141 The Commission considered that in absence of the agreements 
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at issue ‘there would have been real concrete possibilities for the generic 
undertakings to enter the market. The possibility of entering represented a 
plausible assumption and not a merely theoretical hypothesis.’142 
Consequently, the agreements amounted to four separate infringements by 
object  of Article 101(1) TFEU143, and the Commission imposed fines on all 
parties to the agreements at issue. 
6.3 General Court Ruling 
Lundbeck challenged the Commission decision before the GC144, however 
without success. The company’s claims relating to potential competition were 
that the launch of generic products that infringed their IPRs could not be an 
expression of potential competition145, that the Commission had been relying 
on subjective assessments when determining whether the generic 
undertakings were actual or potential competitors of Lundbeck146, and that 
challenging a valid patent did not constitute such a ‘real concrete possibility’ 
of entering the market as demanded by settled case law147. 
 
The GC rejected all Lundbeck’s arguments, stating that the presumption of 
validity of a patent does not automatically equate a presumption of illegality 
of generic products which are claimed by the patent holder to infringe the 
patent.148 The Court also pointed out that the original patents had expired and 
the UK crystallisation patent had not yet been granted at the time for two of 
the agreements at issue.149 Furthermore, the GC said, it was not clear that 
Lundbeck would actually have initiated patent infringement proceedings if 
any of the generic undertakings had entered the market, as they knew their 
crystallisation patent was “not the strongest of all patents”.150 The 
aforementioned meant that the generic companies actually had several ‘real 
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concrete possibilities’ of entering the market when the agreements at issue 
had been concluded, including the launch of a generic product that might have 
led to facing litigation from Lundbeck.151 According to the Court, that 
possibility represented an expression of potential competition.152 
 
The GC found no evidence to the fact that the Commission had not been 
objective enough in its assessment of whether the generic undertakings 
constituted actual or potential competition to Lundbeck. The examining of 
whether the generic undertakings had ‘real concrete possibilities’ of entering 
the market had been carried out carefully by the Commission, and relied on 
objective evidence, in the view of the Court.153 
 
Lastly, in response to Lundbeck’s argumentation that the Commission 
excessively stretched the boundaries of potential competition by considering 
the challenging of Lundbeck’s valid patents as ‘real concrete possibilities’ of 
entering the market the GC stated that ‘the Commission did not take the 
view… that the mere possibility of challenging the validity of a patent before 
a court or before the competent authorities suffices to establish the existence 
of potential competition.’154 They had rather taken several factors into 
consideration when reaching this conclusion, such as the efforts and 
investments made by the generic undertakings in order to be able to enter the 
market, and the fact that some of Lundbeck’s process patents might not be 
valid. Also, the fact that Lundbeck had decided to pay the companies to stay 
off the market showed that the generic undertakings were potential 
competitors, as Lundbeck actually perceived them to be a competitive threat 
on the market, the Court claimed.155 The Court also pointed out that the sums 
paid by Lundbeck largely corresponded to the profits that the generic firms 
expected to make had they entered the market, or to the damages they would 
have obtained if they had been successful in litigation against Lundbeck. This 
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removed any incentive for the generic undertakings to contest the validity of 
Lundbeck’s patents. 156 
 
The Court upheld the Commission’s finding that the agreements at issue all 
amounted to restrictions to competition by object. However, this does not 
mean all patent settlements containing reverse payments should be regarded 
as restrictions by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, only that 
the disproportionate nature of such payments, in combination with several 
other factors led to the conclusion that the agreements in Lundbeck had as 
their object the restriction of competition, within the meaning of Article 
101(1) TFEU.157 The GC dismissed Lundbeck’s action before it in its 
entirety.158 Lundbeck has appealed the judgement to the ECJ.159 
 
Following the Commission decision and GC ruling, opinions have been raised 
regarding the Lundbeck case. The following section presents a few of these. 
6.4 Opinions and Comments 
6.4.1 Niamh Dunne  
Niamh Dunne, Assistant Professor, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, has commented on to what extent the concept of potential 
competition, as used by the Commission and Court in Lundbeck to help reach 
the conclusion that the agreements at issue amounted to restrictions by object, 
has a grounding within the framework of EU competition law. Restrictions 
by object are such which can be regarded as being harmful to the proper 
functioning of competition by their very nature.160 When examining a pay-
for-delay agreement, whether such a harm will actually be realised depends 
to a large extant on antecedent assumptions, such as that market entry actually 
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will be attempted, and that the entry will be successful in lowering market 
prices, thus proving beneficial to consumers.161 However, there is no 
requirement as to succeeding on the market in order to qualify as a potential 
competitor, only ‘real concrete possibilities’ for entry are needed.162 Should 
an agreement with a potential competitor which might, in absence of the 
agreement, not have succeeded and furthered competition on the market, 
really qualify as harmful ‘by its very nature’?163 Dunne finds that since the 
ruling in Cartes Bancaires164 where the ECJ held that an agreement should 
be assessed in light of the ‘content of its provisions, its objectives and the 
economic and legal context of which it forms a part’165, the ruling in Lundbeck 
is in fact compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU as the context provided for in 
the case confirmed the probability that the agreements at issue would in fact 
harm competition.166  
6.4.2 Mark Friend 
Mark Friend provides a different view in his commentary on the ruling.167 As 
previously stated, ‘real concrete possibilities’ for entry, is the decisive factor 
when determining potential competition. But what happens, Friend asks, in a 
situation as in Lundbeck, where the patents held by the originator might 
actually have been infringed by entry into the market by generic 
undertakings? Were there in fact ‘real concrete possibilities’ for entry if such 
entry was potentially unlawful, and likely to provoke litigation?168 
 
Friend finds the logic behind the statement from the GC that the presumption 
of validity of a patent ‘cannot be equated with a presumption of illegality of 
generic products validly placed on the market which the patent holder deems 
to be infringing the patent’, and the view that “at risk” entry (entry at risk of 
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infringing valid patents) actually was an expression of potential competition, 
to be hard to follow.169 The fact that it is up to the patent holder to prove 
patent infringement does not exclude that entry would be unlawful if the 
patent holder is successful in challenging the generic entry.170 With a 
restriction to competition by object the anti-competitive effects can be 
presumed, meaning there is never a need to prove actual effects or to consider 
the counterfactual (the situation in absence of the agreement). Accordingly, 
assessing a potential restriction to competition by effect demands a 
demonstration of anti-competitive effects, through contrasting the situation at 
hand with the situation in absence of the agreement.171 Friend is of the opinion 
that the GC blurred the distinction between the two in its assessment of 
potential competition. The assessment of whether the generic companies had 
‘real concrete possibilities’ to enter the market unavoidably infers some 
consideration of the counterfactual, however the Court fails to recognise 
this.172 Referencing Cartes Bancaires173, where the ECJ rejected arguments 
for a wide interpretation of the concept of restriction by object, Friend 
concludes that the GC has done exactly that. Generally, the judgement leaves 
many questions unanswered and provides very little guidance for those 
involved in negotiating patent settlements. 
 
6.4.3 Enrico Böhme, Jonas Severin Frank and 
Wolfgang Kerber 
 
Another interesting contribution, with a different focus, is that of Böhme, 
Frank and Kerber. Their paper174 in MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series 
in Economics examines how antitrust assessments of patent settlements might 
influence the incentives for challenging patents, and whether such 
assessments should also consider their possible impact on the enticements to 
                                                
169 Friend, p 31. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
173 C-67/13 P. 
174 Boehme, Enrico, Frank, Jonas Severin & Kerber, Wolfgang, Optimal Incentives for 
Patent Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Industry, MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series 
in Economics, 2017. 
 38 
challenge potentially invalid patents. As patent systems rely on private 
litigation to challenge patents an interesting question to consider is when 
firms consider themselves to have enough incentive for challenging 
potentially invalid (‘weak’) patents.175 One issue is that the challenging 
undertaking is not able to internalize all benefits from invalidating such a 
weak patent, since other competitors will also benefit from the removal of an 
unjustified monopoly.176 This ’public good problem’ can lead to inefficiently 
small challenging incentives for individual firms.177  
There is a consensus that patent settlements with reverse payments from 
originators to generics can function as an effective tool for protecting weak 
patents against patent challenges which might lead to invalidation.178 Using 
pay-for-delay agreements, originator undertakings will pay companies for not 
challenging their weak patents in front of a court, and consequently market 
entry and price competition will be delayed, which harms consumers.179 As 
such, reverse patent settlements can function as an instrument for avoiding 
patent litigation and solving the issue of holding a weak patent.180 A concern 
expressed by the authors is that too restrictive an antitrust policy against 
patent settlements, prohibiting reverse payment settlements could result in a 
decrease in generic firms’ incentives for challenging weak patents.181  
In the view of the authors, the present-day discussion almost exclusively 
focuses on on the effects of patent settlements on consumer welfare through 
their effects on prices, in the way that a later generic entry into the market 
will lead to an inefficiently late start of price competition and thus a decrease 
in prices.182 However, this is not the only way in which  patent settlements 
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can affect consumer welfare.183 One should also take into account the effects 
of  antitrust assessments of patent settlements on the incentives for generics 
to challenge patents. Simply stated, the assessment is that limiting the 
possibility for generics to engage in patent settlements which delay generic 
entry will reduce the incentives to challenge patents, since this would limit 
the possibilities for them to profit from patent settlements.184 In this context 
it is interesting to note that the Commission in its Technology Transfer 
Guidelines has expressed that it is in the public interest to remove wrongly 
granted patents to promote competition and innovation.185 A second, more 
far-fetching, argument against too strict antitrust limits on pay-for-delay 
agreements are that such limits might decrease incentives for originator firms 
to innovate. Since antitrust limits for patent settlements influence originators’ 
profits a possible effect is the development of fewer pharmaceuticals, which 
would end up harming consumers.186 This does however not seem to be an 
outcome competition authorities need to worry too much about.187 
Through an existing model framework, the authors do however discover that 
allowing reverse patent settlements which delay the market entry of generic 
firms, compared to the expected market entry under patent litigation, can in 
fact increase consumer welfare under certain conditions. The outcome is 
dependent on e.g. the intensity of competition, the size of the challenging 
costs, and the duration of the delay of the generics’ market entry compared to 
what it would have been in absence of the agreement.188 In conclusion, taking 
into account challenging incentives when assessing pay-for-delay agreements 
under competition law does not alter the need for critical scrutiny in order to 
further elimination of the possibility to protect potentially unjustified and 
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weak patents that can harm consumers. Considering challenging incentives 
can however, as demonstrated, help optimize the antitrust assessment of 
patent settlements.189 
Drawing on this, too harsh scrutiny of pay-for-delay agreements, e.g. 
consequently deeming restricting potential competition as restrictions by 
object, will probably provide for less incentives to challenge weak patents, 
something which in the end can harm consumers. Thus, extending the 
possibility to consider an undertaking as a potential competitor even when its 
market entry could infringe valid patents can, depending on circumstances in 
each case, actually have a negative effect on consumer welfare. 
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6 Final Analysis 
To conclude, it seems that extending the scope for who is to be considered a 
potential competitor, and at the same time opening up the possibility for pay-
for-delay agreements restricting potential competition to amount to 
infringements of competition law by object, might not only hold positive side-
effects. Even though innovation incentives do not seem to be at risk, 
challenging incentives might be. With no room to settle, litigation is a riskier 
venture for generic undertakings, and the enticements to pursue weak patents 
are likely to drop. With a larger number of wrongly granted patents in place, 
consumers will most likely be forced to pay more for a product protected by 
such, than if generic undertakings had been present on the market, delivering 
competing products. 
 
This essay has presented opinions both to the agreement with, and in 
objection to, the Commission’s and Court’s reasoning regarding potential 
competition in Lundbeck. In one view the ruling follows the ECJ’s reasoning 
in Cartes Bancaires, as each agreement was assessed in light of the ‘content 
of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which 
it forms a part’. Another observation, drawing on the same judgement, is that 
the ECJ has already found the GC to be erring in law once when concluding 
that restriction by object was not a concept which needed to be interpreted 
restrictively. Perhaps a similar correction will come after appeal in Lundbeck.  
 
The discussion regarding potential competition has not been possible to 
completely separate from the one regarding the agreements’ restrictions on 
competition to be by object. The two aspects of the ruling in combination is 
probably what may have an impact on future assessments regarding reverse 
patent settlements, as I see it. In my interpretation the case has the potential 
of lowering the bar for what is considered potential competition, through 
deeming entry at risk of infringing patents as a ‘real concrete possibility’ to 
enter a market. However, in order to be certain of this some answers need to 
be provided for. As Friend points out, there are many questions which remain 
 42 
unanswered in the GC’s ruling. How important are the specific facts and 
context of the case, and the specific circumstances of the pharmaceutical 
sector – characterised by highly dynamic competitive process due to the 
holding and expiry of patents? Does the ruling set a new standard for who can 
be regarded as a potential competitor when assessing pay-for-delay 
agreements? Or is the judgement in fact so dependent on circumstances, such 
as disproportionally large payments, other possibilities to enter the market 
than “at risk” entry, and weak patents, that no broader conclusions can or 
should be drawn from it? Hopefully the ECJ will deliver some answers. 
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